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I. GENERATIVE INSIGHTS, FROM THE "SMALL AND PRIVATE" TO THE
"IMMENSE AND PUBLIC"
Law in action is a familiar phrase in legal circles that have come to
accept that law "on the books" does not necessarily mean its translation
into life. But lawmaking through community action is less commonly
perceived to be plausible in liberal secular nation-states such as the United
States. Although the production of law is seen as an artifact of social and
political movements (as well as a tool to organize them) and legal
interpretation is understood to be affected by political views, law is also
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presumed to have some autonomy from politics and social movements.
Given these assumptions, official organs within a polity-such as courts,
legislatures, and the executive--ean be readily identified as "the
lawmakers," and members of that polity who seek to change law are
channeled into certain routes to address those authoritative figures.
That vision of law is incomplete, as was powerfully explained by Robert
Cover in Nomos and Narrative.' There, Cover gave himself the task of
capturing and explaining central yet under-appreciated aspects of what he
called "'meaning' in law.,,2 Cover aspired to expand the inquiry (and
hence our understanding) of legal actors and processes to encompass a
"normative universe . . . held together by the force of interpretative
commitments-some small and private, others immense and public."3
Cover aimed to disrupt the impression that state-based legal regimes
naturally flower where law is sparse. Rather, Cover insisted, at times the
state generates law to impose a singularity on the multiplicity of
lawmaking that is intrinsic, dynamic, and ongoing when individuals live
within self-conscious paideic communities that are inevitably
"jurisgenerative."4 Within Cover's frame, such community lawmaking is
not aberrational but commonplace. And, at times, that generativity
conflicts with the laws of a liberal state, which may respond by acting
imperially to impose a "unified meaning"-its own law--on disparate and
competing legal regimes;5
Cover's understanding of law is thus radically different from conceptions
that separate the public from the private, the secular from the religious, daily
life from conflict about law's meaning, and hence the force oflaw from the
ordinary but coordinated activities of individuals. As Cover described
community-based lawmaking, its generative capacity comes from a
membership for whom the public/private delineations have little relevance.
Rather, through regular acts of affiliation, community members live law's
meaning. Many of their private acts are inevitably also public acts of
obedience to law.
The distinction between, as well as the conflation of, public and private
obedience depends upon two factors: the form taken by communal or
religious obligations and the content of a nation-state's laws. Some people
(the majority in social orders described as "secular") are committed to sub-
communities or religions that segregate acts of affiliation by placing them
primarily inside households or special buildings (churches, synagogues,
1. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative].
2. 1d. at 6.
3. 1d. at 7.
4. 1d.at15.
5. 1d.
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clubs) and by limiting the perfonnance of certain obligations to special days
or places. For members of such groups, the tension between their "private"
affiliations to particular communities of culture and their confonnance to the
nonns of a liberal nation-state is not acute.
In contrast, if one adheres to a community or a religion in which one must
always, for example, wear a head covering, fast during daylight hours for a
month-long span, or say prayers several times a day, the capacity to separate
one's communal obligations from one's role as a member of a nation-state
diminishes. At times, direct conflict erupts. These examples show that the
nonns of the public space are not neutral. Dominant practices inevitably
create a baseline against which other behaviors are assessed as properly a
public (here meaning seen by others) display or as deviant.6
A central example of such tensions for Robert Cover-writing in the early
1980s-eame from the Supreme Court decision addressing the practices of
Bob Jones University,? a Christian religious organization that was
unaffiliated with a particular denomination and that ran a school for children
as well as a university.s Founded in 1927 in Florida, Bob Jones had moved
in the late 1940s to South Carolina where, in 1952, it was established as an
eleemosynary corporation.9 The University had an unusual reading of
Christian scriptures, interpreted to forbid "interracial dating and marriage."10
Initially, the University had admitted only whites. Upon ending that practice,
Bob Jones banned interracial social interactions among its students.
Because· of Bob Jones' racist policies, the Internal Revenue Service
withdrew the University's exemption from federal taxes, and the
University protested. I I As the University explained when seeking
Supreme Court review to maintain its federal tax-exempt status as a
charitable institution, a trial judge had found that the "cornerstone" of its
belief was "Christian religious indoctrination, not isolated academics."12
All of its teachers were required to be "born again" Christians, and all of
6. See generally Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out "; Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox ofa Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 50 I (1993).
7. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), discussed by Cover in Nomos and
Narrative, supra note I, at 26-29, 62-67. The decision also decided the companion case of Goldsboro
Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, No. 81-1 (1982 term), 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977),
affd,644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981) (without a reported opinion).
8. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (D.S.C. 1978). In one phase
of the litigation, Bob Jones described itself as "the world's most unusual university." See Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 734 (1974).
9. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 893.
10. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580 (1983).
II. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 62.
12. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(No. 81-3) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Bob Jones Petition for Certiorari], reprinted in 136 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
1982 TERM SUPPLEMENT 3, 13 (Philip B. Kurland & Berhard Casper eds., 1984) [hereinafter 136
LANDMARK].
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its students were "screened as to their religious beliefs," which included a
view (found "genuine" by the federal courts) of a biblical injunction
against interracial marriage. 13 In short, Bob Jones University was what
Cover called "a normative community"14 whose internal understandings of
its legal obligations came (over time) to conflict with the law of the United
States.
For current readers, so accustomed to the impermissibility of intentional
racial segregation, a more recent set of events should help to underscore why
Bob Jones University v. United States was once not so "easy" a case. A
contemporary illustration of contestation between the norms of the liberal-
state and those of communities of affiliation is the debate about whether
Muslim girls living in France may wear headscarves in public schools. IS As
I will detail below, this conflict parallels that about Bob Jones University in
terms of the intensity of the debate and the claim of a right to a distinctive
practice. But the two examples also differ in important dimensions. Today,
it is hard to imagine a ban on interracial social relations as good for anyone,
nor did one in the 1980s hear support of that practice from African-
Americans. In contrast, some proponents of veiling argue that it empowers
and protects girls and, moreover, some proponents of veiling are girls and
women. 16 Thus, a foray to France and its lawmaking and debates about
veiling are in order.
In the late 1980s, three girls, wearing headcoverings, were prevented from
attending their schools on the grounds that their clothing violated "the
principle of laicite." That tenn-a complex and debated aspect of the French
social order-is today translated as an insistence that public spaces such as
schools be set apart from religious activities and symbols. 17 Thereafter, in
1989, France's Conseil d'Etat ruled that some manifestations of religious
beliefs were appropriate as long as they were not ostentatious. That
13. Bob Jones Petition for Certiorari at 5-6, reprinted in 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 13-14.
According to the Government's filing in response, Bob Jones University provided such education from
kindergarten through graduate school. Brief of the United States on Petitions for Writs ofCertiorari in
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States 3 (Nos. 81-1
& 81-3), reprinted in 136 LANDMARK at 24,30 [hereinafter U.S. Government Certiorari Response of
September 1981).
14. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 62.
15. The shorthand sometimes used for this issue is "l'afJair du foulard," referring to the debate
about women wearing a chador, a hijab or a niqub, which are kinds of veils used in various Muslim
communities. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
182-98 & 185 n.4 (2005). While a good deal of the discussion focuses upon the events in France,
parallel conflicts have emerged in other countries. See. e.g., Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The
German HeadscarfDebate, 2004 BYU 1. REv. 665; Nillifer Gole, Contemporary lslamist Movements
and New Sources for Religious Tolerance, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 17, 26-29 (2003) (addressing the use of
headscarves in Turkey).
16. See generally NILOFER GOLE, THE FORBIDDEN MODERN: CWILIZATION AND VEILING 2-5
(6th prtg. 2003) and discussion infra, notes 190-198 and accompanying text.
17. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Lalicite: A Comparison ofthe United States and
France, 2004 BYU 1. REv. 419,421-23,428-42. Gunn argues that translating lai'cire as "secularity"
is neither exact nor appropriate.
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judgment permitted educators some discretion but did not quiet the discord. 18
The Ministry of Education issued guidelines on what could be worn and did
so again in 1994. 19 Nevertheless, the Conseil d'Etat was called upon to
render decisions in almost fifty cases; one account concludes that about
eighty percent of the rulings were against school officials who had banned
headscarves.2o
Although an advisory body reported in 2000 that the issue had quieted, by
2003 members of the government (then a part of the Union for a Popular
Movement, described as a "conservative" party) insisted that headscarves be
banned "absolutely."21 Soon thereafter, members of the Socialist Party
joined in support of a prohibition on "all external signs of religious
adherence.,,22 In December of 2003, a presidentially-appointed commission
chaired by Bernard Stasi issued a report ("the Stasi Report") that had many
recommendations but which has become known for one: its call for a ban on
the wearing of "clothing and signs manifesting religious or political
affiliations" in public schools.23 Within less than three months, the French
Parliament turned that proposition into a legal prohibition in schools on
clothes and symbols that "conspicuously manifest a religious affiliation"24-
18. Gunn described the decision, Avis Du Conseil D'Etat No. 346893 (Nov. 27, 1989), as
concluding that under the French Constitution of 1958, legal requirements in other provisions, and
France's international law obligations, respect for the "freedom of conscience of the students" would
sometimes entail permitting the wearing of religious clothing or symbols. On the other hand, school
officials could prevent efforts aimed at propagandizing others or disrupting school functions. See
Gunn, supra note 17, at 455-56; see also Elisa T. Beller, The HeadscarfAffair: The Conseil d'Etat on
the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 581, 584-85, 614-15 (2004)
(discussing the initial ruling and some of its consequences). Specifically, the ruling provided: "[u]n
refus d'admission dans une ecole d'un eleve nouvellement inscrit ou un refus d' inscription dans un
college ou un Iycee ne seraitjustifie que par Ie risque d'une menace pour I'ordre dans I'etablissement
ou pour Ie fonctionnement normal du service de I'enseignement."
The full decision and other materials can be found in a volume, hereinafter LmERTE REuGIEUS,
produced under the direction of Bernard Jeufrroy and Franc;ois Tricard, on behalf of the Secretariat
general de la Conference des eveques de France. See LIBERTE REUGIEUS ET REGIMES DES CULTES EN
DROIT FRANCAIS: TEXTES, PRATIQUE ADMINISTRATIVE, JURISPRUDENCE 1031-34 (1996) (quoting
"L'Actualite juridique-Droit administratif, 20 janvier 1990, pp. 39-42). The compilation was intended,
according to the preface by Monseignor Joseph Duval, President of that Conference, to facilitate
access to and understanding of the relevant laws pertaining to religious liberty as debates were
underway. Further, he explained, by publishing this compilation, Catholics were discharging their
civil obligations and exercising their rights (but were not the only ones to do so) when distributing
information to enable appreciation of the complexity of the issues. [d. at 3-4 (my paraphrasing).
19. See LIBERTE REUGIEUS, supra note 18, at 1035-36; Gunn, supra note 17, at 457.
20. Gunn, supra note 17, at 457. See also Beller, supra note 18, at 584-86, 609-23.
21. See Gunn, supra note 17, at 459 & n.166 (citing an April 2003 interview with Jean-Pierre
Raffarin, Prime Minister of France).
22. [d. at 461 (quoting Laurent Fabius, "Ie Principe emancipateur et unificateur de la la'icite,"
available at http://www.psinfo.netJentretiens/fabiusllaicite.html(last visited March 14,2005)).
23. Commission de Reflexion Sur L'Application du Principe de La'icite dans La Republique:
Rapport Au President de La Republique (remis Ie II decembre, 2003), available at
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/000O.pdf (last visited March 14, 2005)
[hereinafter Stasi Report].
24. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15,2004, J.O., Mar. 17,2004 p. 5190. The French provision
states: "Dans les ecoles, les colleges et les Iyces publics, Ie port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les
eleves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdict."
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and thereby set off another wave of activity and commentary.25 Freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, tolerance, women's equality, and the role of
Christianity in a social order are all in play.
Return then to the United States and the early 1980s to consider claims
also argued in terms of religion, tolerance, and equality. The supporters of
Bob Jones University argued it had a constitutional right as a religious
organization to maintain both its recognition as a charitable institutional
and its practice of racial exclusivity. Proponents situated their claim as
one of many instances in which a secular government sought to undermine
what communities understood to be obligatory acts willed by God.26
Cover quoted from one amicus brief, submitted on behalf of the Church of
God in Christ, Mennonite, to highlight the impact of conflict on
communities that were at once insular and yet also a part of or dependent
upon interactions with a secular state.27
Our faith and understanding of scripture enjoin respect and obedience
to the secular governments under which we live. . . . Our religious
beliefs, however, are very deeply held. When these beliefs collide
with the demands of society, our highest allegiance must be toward
God.28
The cri de couer was that such collisions were "the crisis from which we
would be spared' if the United States Constitution's own commitment to
freedom ofreligion were properly understood.29
25. See discussion infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
26. See Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Church of
God in Christ, Mennonite at 3,461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3) [hereinafter Mennonite Bob
Jones Brief]. This brief-filed in relation to the pending petition for certiorari-is not reproduced in
the 136 LANDMARK Compilation dedicated to the Bob Jones litigation.
That compilation includes three amicus briefs in support of Bob Jones's position on the merits. See
Brief Amici Curiae of the American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. joined by the United Presbyterian
Church of the U.S.A., 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 288-307 [hereinafter BaptistJPresbyterian
Bob Jones Brief]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian
Legal Society in Support of Petitioner, 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 308-326; Brief of the
National Association of Evangelicals, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 136 LANDMARK,
supra notel2, at 637-661 [hereinafter Evangelicals Bob Jones Brief].
Three other amici briefs, filed on behalf of Bob Jones at various stages, are not included in the
Landmark Compilation. See Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari on
Behalf of the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No. 81-3)
[hereinafter Amish Bob Jones Brief]; Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of
Congressman Trent Lott, Pro Se Amicus Curiae, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-3) [hereinafter Lott Bob Jones
Amicus Filing]; Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs as Amicus
Curiae, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3) [hereinafter COLPA Bob Jones Brief].
27. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 27 (citing and quoting the Mennonite Bob
Jones Brief, supra note 26). Counsel for the Mennonites explained, his client "preferred to make its
position known to this Honorable Court in its own words. Counsel, in filing this brief, therefore
presents verbatim" its views. [d. at I. The opening "dagger" footnote of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bob Jones does not refer to this filing. See 461 U.S. at 576, t at 5.
28. Mennonite Bob Jones Brief, supra note 26, at 3-4 (quoted in greater length in Cover, Nomos
and Narrative, supra note I, at 27).
29. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 27, quoting the Mennonite Bob Jones Brief,
supra note 26, at 4. The emphasis was added by Cover. See also Amish Bob Jones Brief, supra note
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As the long list of amici briefs filed in the Supreme Court evidences,30 Bob
Jones University v. United States and its companion case, Goldsboro
Christian Schools v. United States,3l were part of a struggle over racial
discrimination in public and private schools, clubs, and places of
accommodation. That conflict entailed not only repeated actions by and
against the Internal Revenue Service related to the tax-exempt status of
schools that maintained racial divides, but also legislative efforts in
26, at 4 (arguing that religious bodies ought not to be forced to comply with secular government's
understandings of "public policy" and that the specter of such obligations "rightly raises in the Amish
mind memories of decrees of many another sovereign, in their long and difficult history, seeking to
force, under penalty, conformity to the will of the state."). The COLPA Brief, also in support of Bob
Jones, ended by quoting Emily Dickinson.
Much Sense-the Starkest Madness-
'T is the Majority.
In this, as All, prevails-
Assent-and you are sane-
Demur-you're straightway dangerous-
And handled with a Chain-
COLPA Bob Jones Brief, supra note 26, at 20.
30. Filings on behalf of the position that the IRS had acted properly to end the exemption were
more numerous and included briefs from the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish
Committee (136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 214-87), the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
under Law (136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 453-90), the NAACP et al. (136 LANDMARK, supra
note 12, at 491-569), the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (136 LANDMARK, supra
note 12, at 570-636), the National Association of Independent Schools, (136 LANDMARK, supra note
12, at 666-80), the Independent Sector (136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 425-452), the North
Carolina Association of Black Lawyers (136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 673-91), and William T.
Coleman, Jr., who had been "invited by the Court" to file a brief. See Brief of Amicus Curiae In
Support of the Judgments Below, filed by William T. Coleman, Jr., invited by Order of April 19, 1982.
136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 327-414 [hereinafter Coleman Bob Jones Amicus Brief]. That
order can be found at Goldboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982) (asking
Coleman "to brief and argue cases as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below"). His role is
discussed infra, notes 116-19, 122 and accompanying text.
Also arguing that the IRS had properly exercised its discretion to withdraw the tax-exempt status of
Bob Jones University, but not included in the LANDMARK Compilation, were the Anti-Defamation
League of B'Nai B'rith, the International Human Rights Law Group, and Lawrence E. Levy. See
Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, as Amicus
Curiae, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, and
Brief of the International Human Rights Law Group, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3); Motion
for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, and Brief of Lawrence E. Levy on behalf of affirmance of the
decisions below, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3).
In addition, after the Government changed its position and asked the Court to vacate the lower
court decisions upholding the IRS withdrawal of tax exempt status, Laurence H. Tribe and Bernard
Wolfman filed, on behalf of "teachers, scholars, and students of constitutional law and tax law," an
amici curiae brief in both the Bob Jones litigation and the companion case of Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States. The Tribe/Wolfman brief opposed the government's request and argued
that the case was not moot. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae, and Brief of Laurence
H. Tribe and Bernard Wolfman as Amici Curiae with Respect to Respondent's Motion to Vacate, 461
U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3) [hereinafter Tribe/Wolfman Bob Jones Brief]. A similar position
was taken by the United Church of Christ, explaining that it had not taken a position earlier because it
had "expected that its views would be adequately represented by the Solicitor General." Motion of
Agencies of the United Church of Christ for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae on Questions of
Mootness and Standing at 3, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3), reprinted in 136 LANDMARK,
supra note 12, at 692, 695 [hereinafter the United Church of Christ Bob Jones Mootness Filing].
31. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 146
(4th Cir. 1980), ajJ'd, 461 US. 574 (1983); Goldboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.
Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981) (unpublished/table notation).
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Congress, several lawsuits, and changes in the positions taken on behalf of
the United States Government as the administrations switched from
Presidents Nixon to Ford to Carter to Reagan.32 The proponents of a rule
that tax exemptions ought not to be provided to segregated schools run by
religious groups included (at times) the United States Government and (more
consistently) the NAACP, the ACLU, and several religiously-affiliated
organizations. Their opponents, in addition to Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools, were other religious organizations, many of
which distanced themselves from the scriptural interpretation proffered by
Bob Jones but argued for a First Amendment right to hold such a view.33
Cover's innovations in discussing this conflict are several. First, rather
than posit the legal commitments of normative communities as
impermissibly disruptive of the congenial order of the nation-state, Cover
identified the state as the aggressive force, jurispathic in its ability to
quash such communities' own commitments when they are at odds with
national norms.34 More than that: when successful, the "coercive
dimension of law" of the state destroys the plausibility that the competing
interpretation is a form of legitimate legal interpretation.35 In other words,
now that secular rule against racial segregation (itself not yet sixty years
old in the United States) is pervasive, it has so much force as to make one
skeptical that Bob Jones's scriptural claim of a divine obligation to
segregate could have been anything other than an insincere effort to avoid
federal law. Secular law obliterates the stature of the other claim as "law."
Second, Cover insisted that the enactment of law by community
practices is in fact "law," rather than just "customs" or "practices." Those
terms have, in American legal parlance, gained an anthropological gloss
that make them less than true peers of the "real" law, assumed to consist
only of positive enactments such as statutes and constitutions or
32. Some of the various IRS positions and legislative efforts between 1971 and 1982 are
described in the amicus filing by Congressman Lott. See Lott Bob Jones Amicus Filing, supra note
26, at 2-6.
33. See. e.g., Baptist/Presbyterian Bob Jones Brief, supra note 26, at 1, 136 LANDMARK, supra
note 12, at 293 (disagreeing with Bob Jones University's leaders on their reading of scriptures and
believing their policies and beliefs to be "racist," but supporting that University because sincere
religious beliefs should be protected by the First Amendment); Mennonite Bob Jones Brief, supra note
26, at (I) of the Statement of the Interests of the Amicus (describing the Mennonite Church's work in
"support of victims of oppression and bigotry whether the opposition is motivated by class, racial, or
religious beliefs," its opposition to "racial discrimination of any kind," and its disagreement with Bob
Jones University that the Scriptures forbid interracial dating). The Brief of the National Association of
Evangelicals, supra note 26, at 2, 136 LANDMARK at 642, stated that "[m]ost evangelicals would not
agree with the view of Bob Jones University that interracial dating and marriage is contrary to
Scripture." COLPA's brief, supra note 26, at 1, struck a similar note, "wishing to make clear that it
strongly disapproves and condemns the racial practices" of Bob Jones and of Goldsboro Christian
Schools, and that such were contrary to "Jewish religious principles."
34. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 40.
35. Id. at 48.
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pronouncements from government officials such as judges.36
Third, for Cover it was the state's fear ofthejurispotence37 of normative
communities that needed to be explained and justified. He wanted the
state's actors (here, its judges and, derivatively, commentators on their
work) to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own power,
respectful of the legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the
possibility that multiple meanings and divergent practices ought
sometimes to be tolerated, even ifpainfully so.
But identifying the state's jurispathic authority did not result in Cover's
rejection of the exercise of that power. Rather, Cover produced the very
justification that he insisted was required when state law imposed itself
upon paideic community practices. Cover explained the utility of an
"imperial mode,"38 sometimes properly imposing its singularity. As he
described, when judges kill law by asserting that "this one is the law and
destroy or try to destroy the rest," judges both do violence and enable
peace.39 Too much law is too chaotic to sustain and some laws-even if
legitimately generated by such communities-are noxious. In Cover's
words, it is judges' "regulative function that permits a life of law rather
than violence.'>40 As he put it, it is the "work of courts, which commonly
inhibit-but occasionally foster-the processes of creating legal
meaning."41
The imposition of imperial law ought not, however, be done innocently,
unaware of its impact on other forms of law and therefore disrespectful of
the validity of those other sources of lawmaking.42 Nor ought it hide
behind the guise that its function is to impose clarity, given the uncertain
(but implicitly unitary) nature oflaw. Rather, the 'jurispathic function of
courts" should entail a frank acknowledgement of its purpose: to constrain
too much law emanating from divergent sources. Further, judges (and
commentators) ought to recognize that the authority to impose a single
hermeneutic stems from power itself rather than adopt a more comfortable
36. In countries with a more robust commitment to common law-that may be in part an artifact
of the absence of a written constitution--eustomary practices may not be understood as so obviously
secondary to other legal sources.
37. Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at IS. Unlike Cover's terms "jurisgenerative" and
"jurispathic," this word is less frequently cited. A quick check of Westlaw located discussions of
Cover and the terms "jurisgenerative" and "jurispathic" in more than 145 instances, whereas the search
for Cover and "jurispotence" found the term "jurispotence" cited in only three articles. See Perry
Dane, The Public, The Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a Theme ofNomos and Narrative, 8
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. IS, 18 (1996); Susan B. Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, 8 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LIT. 65, 114, n.8I (1996); Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication:
Toward a Jurisgenetic Theory ofLaw, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1623, 1632 (1999).
38. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 14.
39. Id. at 53.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 26.
42. See, e.g., Cover's discussion, id. at 44 (describing state law that "shuts down the creative
hermeneutic of principle that is spread" through and by communities).
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(but false) proposition that a legal regime triumphs because it is superior.43
Thus, unlike Robert Post, who reads Robert Cover as turning "quite
palpably away from the state"44 when he focused on the violence done in
the name of court orders,45 I read Cover as endlessly fascinated with the
interactions between the state and paideic communities-and with the
potential for such interactions themselves to be jurisgenerative moments.
Cover did not forsake courts, but rather (and disquietingly for many within
the academy) refused to privilege judges' readings.46 He was, instead,
"asserting that within the domain of constitutional meaning, the
understanding of [religious groups such as] the Mennonites assumes a
status equal (or superior) to that accorded to the understanding of the
Justices of the Supreme Court.,,47
Below, I explain this reading of Cover, thereby detailing why I think
that Post misconceives Cover's project. I then take up a different
argument: why, within Cover's own terms, the decision in the Bob Jones
case is not-as Cover posited-a failure of engagement. Instead, I believe
that the imposition on Bob Jones University of national nondiscrimination
norms ought, within Cover's lexicon, to be identified as exemplary of
what Cover hoped might be produced when the law of the state takes
seriously the lawmaking of communities of faith.
What is instructive about the full exploration of the conflict about Bob
Jones is that it produced more than a decade of contestation inside the
United States government about what its own anti-racist norms entailed.
That occasion for conflict within and between the nation~state and paideic
community eventually produced the revelation of each legal regime's
commitments. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, anti-
segregationist premises-that is to say, rejection of explicit racial
segregation-had already become an embedded and unself-conscious
43. Id. at 42 ("Modem apologists for the jurispathic function of courts usually state the problem
not as one of too much law, but as one of unclear law.") (emphasis in the original). Here, Cover
directly disagrees with Owen Fiss's formulation. See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). The stance taken by Fiss was characterized by Cover as "too easy"
because it assumed the virtue of the federal judiciary. Cover argued that the "challenge presented by
the absence of a single, 'objective' interpretation is, instead, the need to maintain a sense of legal
meaning despite the destruction of any pretense of superiority of one nomos over another." Nomos
and Narrative, supra note I, at 44.
44. Robert C. Post, Who's Afraid ofJurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos
and Narrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 9, II (2005) [hereinafter Post, Jurispathic Courts].
45. Post also relies on another essay by Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601 (1986). See discussion infra note 55 and accompanying text on my differing view of that essay.
46. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 57, n.158 ("I accord no privileged character to
the work of the judges. I would have judges act on the basis of a committed constitutionalism in a
world in which each of many communities acts out of its own nomos and is prepared to resist the work
of the judges in many instances.").
47. Id. at 28-29 (describing the Mennonite community as creating "law as fully as does the
judge," and living by their "proclaimed understanding" that sometimes required migration to continue
to live by their beliefs).
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facet of American "truth." The moment for frank acknowledgement of
American law's jurispathic powers had passed because the particular form
of racism embraced by Bob Jones University had already become
implausible.
Other forms were, however, more resilient. As Cover discussed at the
time,48 the debate about the legality of informal self-segregation was well
underway. Moreover, legal toleration of self-segregation was emerging as
the Supreme Court upheld practices such as tax deductions given by states
for payments for private education.49
After offering this alternative reading of Bob Jones, I conclude by
taking up an issue that Cover did not: conflict within paideic communities
about their own practices and authoritative interpretations. I return to the
practice of veiling, as well as address the question of federal toleration of
patrilineal membership rules, as I argue that today's central conflicts
involve contestation from within. This aspect is often obscured as debates
are posited to exist between a homogenous self (such as "the United
States" or "the West") and an undifferentiated other (be it "Indian tribes,"
"Islam," or "the veil"). Twenty-five years after Nomos and Narrative, our
central issues are whose voices within paideic communities are heard by
which speakers of the secular order's power.
II. LEARNING FROM PAIDEIC COMMUNITIES
In Nomos and Narrative, Cover called law "a resource in signification
that enables us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace,
humiliate, or dignify."50 Cover wanted us to understand that the law of the
state-and especially that pronounced by judges-was only one of many
sets of laws. Moreover, Cover insisted that the law of the state was in
some sense less potent and less compelling than that generated through
certain kinds of communities, which demand that law lace life-that law
compel individuals in small and large fashion-by specifying a host of
daily actions that at times diverge from the behaviors of non-members.
Nomos and Narrative focuses on religious communities, including
Mennonite, Amish, Jewish, and Evangelical Christian groups, all of which
Cover found attractive because their laws have the strength of being
forged through practice. As Cover noted, his was not a distinction
between law in practice and law on the books.51 Rather, his focus was on
law as practice itself or, more accurately, laws as practices themselves.
The plural is relevant for it is through the thickness and the compulsion of
48. See infra notes 89, 162, 165 and accompanying text.
49. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), discussed infra note 163 and accompanying text.
50. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 7.
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daily activities that communities' laws gain their strength.52 As Cover
explained, the discourses of lawmaking in such communities are multi-
faceted: "initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and performative."53 Further,
those discourses often do not sound in the "critical and analytic" tone
common in the American legal academy.54
Cover not only wanted us to realize that these communities are sources
of law, jurisgenerative as he (and now we) label them. He insisted that
laws thus made are stronger in the sense of having a palpable power that
can often exceed the kind of strength exhibited by judge-made law. The
concept of performance is key: in general, judges pronounce the meaning
of law but do not have to enact those meanings by themselves engaging in
the activity that they require-by living the law that they make.
These different forms of being a person "of' law (that is, a judge in a
nation-state as contrasted with a member of a paideic community) is
further explained by Cover in another essay, Violence and the Word. 55
There, entering a conversation among theorists about interpretation as a
practice common to both the disciplines of law and of literature,56 Cover
objected to the too-ready equation of the two forms of interpretation.57
While both law and literature deal with the meaning of words, law-
unlike literature-intrinsically entails a kind of violence. Cover used the
word "violence" to force the uncomfortable acknowledgement that judicial
lawmaking uses the power of the state to disrupt actual lives.
Yet violence occasioned by judicial order is a peculiar and constrained
52. As Cover explained, his focus was on laws developed through worlds made of practices that
were repetitive, obliged, insistent, and continuing. His examples included Jewish obligations of daily
worship that (if male) are required to be con·stant. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at
12 (discussing the interaction among 'Torah, worship, and deeds of kindness").
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id. On rare occasions, members of the judiciary do link their lawmaking to passionate
engagement. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 42
THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 948 (1987). See a/so
Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" ofDeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1513 (1989) (calling for judicial engagement to impose obligations upon government for
personal wellbeing).
Justice Brennan's lecture discussed his famous decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
which had mandated procedural due process prior to the termination of an individual's welfare
benefits. Brennan stated that the decision demonstrated that the Due Process Clause was "not simply
the blueprint for an empire of reason" but also responsive to the concern that bureaucratic
decisionmaking lacked a "dimension of passion, of empathy, necessary for a full understanding of the
human beings affected by those procedures." Brennan, Reason, Passion, at 973. That stance was one
that Owen Fiss found disquieting. See Owen Fiss, The Other Goldberg, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 229 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds.,
1992). There, Fiss described Brennan's introduction of a "new element into the decisional process:
passion," and objected to it. Id. at 235,239-43.
55. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 45.
56. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 43; Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36
STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984). See generally, Symposium, Interpretation Methodologies from Other
Disciplines, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1985).
57. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 49 (legal meaning cannot take place "without
the committed action that distinguishes law from literature").
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form. Although judges make rulings that reallocate personal property,
limit individual freedoms, and even contribute to ending lives, judges do
not themselves carry out the orders that they issue. Therefore, judges
rarely are put to the kinds of tests endured by members of communities of
faith. Judges generally do not experience, let alone have to suffer on
account of, their own interpretations of law. Unlike the Mennonites, the
Amish, certain sets of Jews, and others, federal judges (as judges) do not
live in the "integrated world of obligation and nomos.,,58
But rather than seeing that difference as an irreparable fault of state
legal regimes, Cover understood its utility. The awesome power of state
lawmaking is cabined (properly from Cover's vantage point) because
judges must depend on others to implement that which they insist law
requires. Law, state-made, takes time and a range of people to transform
its injunctions into enforceable regimes.59 Because a chain of actors is
needed to tum court law into action, the potential for non-implementation
arises. In this cumbersome structure, space exists for refusal and
reinterpretation. The state's imperial judge-made law thus comes with a
cushion, and the unwieldy enterprise of turning law into practice imposes
a useful constraint, even if (or precisely because) it sometimes makes the
state's law less effective.
One more distinction between the law of paideic communities and that
of the nation-state needs to be underscored. Cover's examples of
communities of commitment included many that were centuries old, small
(actually tiny) in number, and yet sustained remarkably distinct legal
regimes across time, place, and enormous changes in the politics and
economies of the countries in which they lived. Cover insisted that such
communities were instructive because they showed that the creation of
enduring legal meaning required action, not just words. As Cover
detailed, the Mennonites did not just pronounce law, they exemplified
what he called "living their law.,,60 Their commitment to their own
obligations was such that, when host nations attempted to dislodge them,
they were put to the test of dislocation: they were required either to
reaffirm or to abandon a set of core beliefs and, if reaffirming, either to
suffer persecution or to migrate.
In contrast, for much of the United States' history, many judges (and
many citizens) have been able to state their understanding of law without
facing tests of their commitment to the principles they elaborated.61 Cover
58. Id. at 31.
59. A distinct question is the degree to which judges remain identifiably responsible for their
actions. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization ofthe Judiciary, 92 YALE LJ. 1442 (1983).
60. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 49.
61. Obvious exceptions exist. The hostility encountered by judges tasked with ordering
desegregation of southern schools has been carefully chronicled. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES:
THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE
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thus identified the potential thinness of those commitments. As he
cautioned, "[t]he universalist virtues that we have come to identify with
modem liberalism, the broad principles of our law, are essentially system-
maintaining 'weak' forces.,,62 Contemporary evidence for his proposition
can readily be found in the juxtaposition of American ideals of liberty and
a series of memoranda in 2002 from the Department of Justice explaining
the legality of torture and of detention without rights.63
The relative disengagement of the state's judges did not, however, make
Cover uninterested in its law for he understood that its antiseptic character
enabled judges to impose a singularity that, upon occasion, was demanded
to maintain order.64 The questions for Cover were not if or whether the
state should sometimes exert its will, but rather when and how to do so.
As he put it, the "challenge presented by the absence of a single,
'objective' interpretation is ... the need to maintain a sense of legal
meaning despite the destruction of any pretense of superiority of one
nomos over another.,,65
Moreover, Cover was attracted-in Nomos and Narrative and in other
writings-to the interaction among many communities' legal systems that
had varying degrees of insularity. For him, competition and
complementation among legal systems could itself be generative, as Cover
argued in two other articles, one (co-authored with Alexander Aleinikoff)
including the term "dialectical federalism" in its title66 and the other using
the phrase "jurisdictional redundancy."67 In both essays, Cover addressed
SUPREME COURT'S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981). More recent
examples include William Wayne Justice (a federal district court judge who upheld the rights of
prisoners in Texas and was faced with social ostracism and threats against him) and Margaret Marshall
(who, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, occasioned hostility for pronouncing
the rights of gays to marry). See David Maraniss, Justice, Texas Style: A Populist Judge, Shaking up
the State/rom his Courtroom in Tyler, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,1987, at GI (describing the hostility
toward Judge Justice, once called "the most hated man in Texas"); Emily Bazelon, The Woman Behind
Gay Marriage, LEGAL AFFAIRS May/June 2004, at 39-41 (discussing the attacks on Chief Justice
Margaret Marshall, including the chanting of "Hey hey, ho, ho, Margaret Marshall has got to go"
outside the Court and the "collision course" with the legislature that emerged in the wake of the ruling
finding a state constitutional right to marry persons of the same sex).
62. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 12.
63. See, e.g., Memorandum of Aug. I, 2002 from Jay S. Bybee Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
srv.nationidocuments/dojinterrogationrnem020020801.pdf (last visited March 24, 2005), rescinded by
Memorandum of December 30, 2004 from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, for James B. Corney, Deputy Attorney General, Regarding Legal Standards Applicable
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (last visited
March 9, 2005); Sanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture: An Introduction, in TORTURE 23 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2004).
64. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 44, 53.
65. Id. at 44.
66. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035 (1977).
67. Robert M. Cover, The Uses 0/Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981).
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the layered federalism of the United States. He argued that when the legal
systems of the United States and individual states were sufficiently
distinct, a confluence of norms could provide evidence of a thicker
commitment to a particular understanding of a given precept. Where
divergence existed, conflict required one or the other legal regime to give
way, which in tum imposed the obligation that legal actors recommit to a
particular rule or reconfigure its parameters.
For me, that interplay is repeatedly evidenced in judicial exchanges
about the degree to which federally-recognized Indian tribes are
autonomous in the United States' law.68 In some instances, the Supreme
Court has insisted that tribes have considerable freedom to govern
themselves and, occasionally, nonmembers as well. One decision, for
example, refused a woman's challenge to a tribe's patrilineal membership
rules which governed enrollment as an Indian and hence access to receipt
of federal benefits available for tribal members. 69 In contrast, the Court
has been much less respectful of tribal autonomy in other contexts. The
Court has held that tribes have no ability to prosecute "non-Indians" who
commit minor offenses on triballands,?o to exercise civil jurisdiction over
tribal members' claims of wrongful searches and seizures on tribal lands
by state officials,?' or to control the zoning of land held by non-Indians
within a tribe's borders.72 When the Supreme Court accedes to or refuses
tribal claims of self-governance, it gives evidence of how deeply ingrained
are certain federal precepts from which deviance will not be tolerated.
Through exchanges such as these, judges' commitments are tested, and
through their rulings, state lawmaking delineates which variations from its
norms are tolerable. As Cover later explained (in an exchange with Owen
Fiss that we reproduced in the 1988 publication of the casebook,
Procedure, co-authored by the three ofus):
Nomos is fundamentally a piece about the necessary disjuncture
between the range of state violence and the range of legal meaning; ...
[T]he article in no way holds up insular religious communities as a
model for law reform. It holds them as clear examples of divergent
understandings of legal meaning; it treats them as unambiguous
instances of the unshared, noneonsensual dimensions of legal
understanding within the American Empire....
68. See Judith Resnik, Applying the Myths and Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 77 (2004); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1989).
69. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), discussed infra notes 176-89 and
accompanying text.
70. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
71. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
72. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 430
(1989).
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I am insistent that the apparent capacity of the courts to fashion a life
of shared meaning is always seriously compromised and often
destroyed by the violence which is the implicit or explicit threat
against those who do not share the judge's understandings. I, like
Owen [Fiss], celebrate the achievements of federal courts in
destroying apartheid in America. Like Owen, I favor federal courts
taking a lead in reforming institutions when the other officials fail.
But it is Fiss not Cover who is the romantic here. It is Fiss who
supposes that those achievements emerge out of a shaped community
of interpretation that is national in character. I support those efforts
because I believe them right and justified, because I am sufficiently
committed to join with others in imposing our will on those who
disagree. At times the federal courts have been our allies in those
commitments. There is every reason to believe that such a
convergence of interests was temporary and accidental; that it is
already changing and will soon be a romantic memory of the sublime
sixties.73
These comments were written in the middle of the 1980s. Read in 2005,
Cover's description of the "temporary" convergence of progressive efforts
to deepen equality and the attitudes of federal judges is all too prescient, as
is his reference to "the American Empire." But, as I detail below, while
coolly appraising the state's limitations, Cover also wished for more from
the state. In Nomos and Narrative, Cover revealed that even as he refused
to privilege judges' interpretations, he thought that through conflicts such
as those engendered by challenges from paideic communities, generative
lawmaking could emerge.
III. COVERIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR THE STATE'S JUDGES
Cover was consistently interested in instances of civil disobedience
because they put all the participants to the test of their understanding of
legal obligation. In the 1970s, he wrote Justice Accused, which examined
judicial enforcement of slavery in the pre-Civil War era.74 In 1985, Cover
published Folktales of Jurisdiction,75 an essay that used a sequence of
confrontations between judges and kings (such as the encounter between
Lord Coke and King James) to explore the complex authority of the judge,
empowered by the state yet sometimes obliged to sit in judgment of the
state. In Nomos and Narrative, Cover returned to some of these
73. ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS, & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE 729-730 (1988); also
reprinted in OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATNES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 482 (2003).
74. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
75. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179
(1985).
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instances76 and added the example of Bob Jones University's insistence on
racial segregation.
His examples thus vary in terms of the actors in focus (sometimes state-
empowered jurists, sometimes kings, sometimes insular communities) and
the attractiveness or toxicity (from the perspective of liberal secularism) of
the principle espoused by the deviant legal actor. Among these actors,
judges were specially situated for they had either to "affirm interpretation
of the law through violence against protestors or permit polynomia of
legal meaning."77 As Cover argued, law review writing does not force
such interaction. Protest does.78
While Nomos and Narrative offered several criticisms of judges, it can
fairly be read to show that Cover also harbored a hope that, by contesting
meaning through practices oppositional to the nation-state, community
protests would bring such movements into courts. Pressed to choose
among competing legal regimes, judges have to rethink and recommit
themselves to their own understandings of foundational legal obligations.
Through such contestation, judges have to take some heat, either to shape
interpretations of the nation-state's law that permit competing nomoi to
live their visions of obligation or to decide that the particular conflict
requires a singular commitment and conflicting legal regimes must be
squelched. (Whether the imposition of the nation's law will result in
extinguishing such practices can not be clear at the initial phase of conflict
but would become known over time.) In that interaction, judges come into
close contact with those living their legal beliefs. Specific examples of a
willingness to disobey the state's laws push judges into either using the
state's power to eradicate the protestors' beliefs or shifting the state's law
to tolerate those contrarian practices.
And, state actors are not the only ones challenged through conflict. As
76. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 42-43, 58-59 (describing the interaction
between Justice Edward Coke and King James).
77. Id. at 47-48.
78. The symposium from which these papers emerged was held on April 25, 2004, the day on
which thousands marched in Washington, D.C. in an effort to preserve the rights of women to choose
if and when to have children. See March for Women's Lives, available at
http://www.marchforwomen.org/contentlindex.php?pip=14&PHPSESSID=c4c4fbc206aa94 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2005). Hence those of us who participated in the symposium, but would otherwise
have gone to march, reminded ourselves that Robert Cover often left the academy to support change
by direct participation. Cover was active in many movements, including an effort to have Yale divest
itself of South African investments when that country was under an apartheid regime. Cover
supported the construction of a symbolic Shanty on the plaza of the Beinecke Library and as a result
was charged with overseeing the use of that plaza. That job meant he not only decided that the Shanty
could stay but also had the work of daily oversight about what other protests, celebrations, or activities
could take place in that space. The photograph of Cover, reproduced on the cover of this volume and
which hangs in a Yale Law School seminar room dedicated to him by the Class of 1986, shows him on
the campus with a group of students at a teach-in related to protests against Yale's holdings of
investments in South Africa. See Dirk Johnson, Apartheid and Yale: A Week ofProtest, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1986, at L29. The photograph printed with that article in the New York Times and the one
used here are different shots of that scene.
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Cover explained, "the state influences interpretation: for better or worse,
most communities will avoid outright conflict with a judge's
interpretations, at least when he will be likely to back them with
violence."79 Through the exchange when the community insists on the
lawfulness of its practices and the state responds, both the community and
the state are tested. The stakes for insular communities to live their laws
change as the state or other powerful actors object. In that confrontation,
one side has to blink--either the state or the paideic community-and in
that pushing or backing off, some adaptation meriting the label
''jurisgenerative'' might well occur.80
What annoyed Cover was jurists' use of devices of jurisdiction to
deflect the need to rule on the merits of the conflicts. In Nomos and
Narrative, Cover criticized several Supreme Court decisions for relying on
issues of jurisdiction in lieu of acknowledging conflict and facing its
implications. For example, Cover criticized the Supreme Court's decision
in Walker v. City of Birmingham, involving civil rights protestors who
marched in Birmingham, Alabama rather than obey what appeared to be a
facially illegal injunction restraining them from doing SO.81 The Court's
response-that one must obey an illegal provision in order to contest it-
enabled the justices to avoid endorsing or condemning the propriety of the
act of disobedience.82
According to Cover, the Court "ultimately responsible for the
interpretation" did not "commit itself separately to the proposition that the
particular interpretation warrants violence."83 That posture made "public
order" the "predicate to creation of legal meaning,"84 whereas Cover
argued that public disorder was an important element in the creation of
legal meaning. Similarly, Cover objected to decisions that deferred to the
authority of police or other state officials by creating jurisdictional
doctrines85 designed to avoid "courts from ever reaching the threatening
questions."86 Through such decisions, jurists were "ferreting out
79. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 53.
80. [d. at 53.
81. 388 U.S. 307 (1967), discussed in Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 55-56.
Cover's disapproval of the case was shared by Owen Fiss, who has written movingly about it. See
Owen Fiss, The Civilizing Hand o/the Law? Birmingham, 1963,89 YALE REv. 1,6-9 (2001). Fiss
described the application by the Southern Christian Leadership Congress for applications in April of
1963 to march, the denial, and Dr. Martin Luther King's decision to march on Good Friday, followed
by his imprisonment and his penning of the "famed 'Letter from a Birmingham Jai1.'" As Fiss
explained, the opinion came in 1967, four years after the march and after waves of violent rather than
peaceful protest, and as the Court's agenda had begun to shift from "dismantling Jim Crow to
maintaining law and order." ld. at 19.
82. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. at 320-21.
83. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 55.
84. 1d.
85. [d. at 56. Cover cited as examples Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
86. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 56.
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jurisdictional excuses to avoid disrupting the orderly deployment of state
power and privilege."87
Cover focused on the 1983 Supreme Court decision in the case of Bob
Jones University v. the United States88 as one of his central examples of
this form of judicial avoidance.89 As Chief Justice Warren Burger, who
wrote the majority opinion in the 1983 Supreme Court decision explained,
Bob Jones University was "dedicated to the teaching and propagation of
the fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs. . .. The sponsors of the
University genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and
marriage. To effectuate those views, Negroes were completely excluded
until 1971."90
In the years thereafter, the University accepted applications only from
"Negroes married within their race.,,91 In 1976, after the Supreme Court
ruled that racial exclusion from private schools was unconstitutional,92 the
University changed its policy to permit "unmarried Negroes to enroll; but
a disciplinary rule prohibit[ed] interracial dating and marriage."93
Bob Jones University was categorized under United States tax law as a
"charitable" institution and therefore its income was specially sheltered
from taxation. Prior to 1970, the Internal Revenue Service gave such tax
exemptions "to all private schools, regardless of racial policy."94 In 1970,
after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was itself sued,95 the IRS
withdrew the tax-exempt status of the University. In 1971, in a per curiam
decision, the Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge court ruling that the
IRS could not give tax exemptions to Mississippi public or private schools
that did not maintain a policy ofnondiscrimination.96
87. Id. at 67.
88. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
89. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 25-33, 62-68. In an op-ed written shortly after
the Supreme Court's decision, Cover had been more supportive of its ruling but critical of another
decision, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), upholding a tuition tax deduction given by Minnesota
for private schools. See Robert M. Cover, Court Has High Aim, Bad Plan on Bias, N.Y.TIMES, Jul.
II, 1983, at A15. Cover described the Bob Jones decision as:
[F]ull of the language of equality. . .. And while the practical implications of the Bob Jones
decision are not great (honest and sincere religious commitment to racial discrimination is not
all that common), the extension of a public subsidy to such practices through the tax code would
have been a dangerous signal conferring respectability and moral legitimacy on positions quite
properly considered abhorrent-to be tolerated in a spirit of liberty but emphatically not to be
encouraged.
Id. See also infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
90. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580.
91. Id.
92. McCrary v. Runyon, SIS U.S. 160 (1976).
93. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580.
94. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, ISO (4th Cir. 1980).
95. See Green v. Kennedy, 308 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970) (granting, at the request of black
parents in Mississippi, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IRS from according a tax exempt status
to private schools in Mississippi that practiced racial discrimination).
96. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), ajf'd sub nom Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
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Thereafter the Service issued several rulings to implement the policy,97
including revocation of the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones. Bob Jones
University responded with a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the revocation, but
the Supreme Court held that such an affirmative action was barred by anti-
injunction provisions of the Tax Code.98 However, the Court noted the
availability of an alternative to raise the issue,99 which Bob Jones
followed-bringing a new action to recover twenty-one dollars it claimed
to have overpaid on unemployment tax. The Government responded by
counterclaiming that an additional $489,675.59 was due. IOO The Fourth
Circuit upheld the IRS action. The issue on which Bob Jones sought
Supreme Court review in 1982 was whether "private schools that prescribe
and enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of
religious doctrine, qualify as tax exempt organizations under" the Tax
Code. IOI
But because of a change in the Oval Office, the posture of the case
before the Court was not straightforward. Some of the IRS
decisionmaking had occurred while Jimmy Carter was the President. In
1980, Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency. Between 1981 and the oral
argument of the case in October of 1982, the Reagan Administration took
a number of different tacks, some of them unusual.
Specifically, in September of 1981, when initially responding to Bob
Jones University's petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth Circuit's
decision in favor of the IRS, the United States Government urged the
Court to take the case and to affirm. The Government stated that the IRS
had "acted within its statutory authority" when revoking the tax-exempt
status of Bob Jones and that the application of this "nondiscrimination
principle" did not violate the religious rights of the University. 102
Accordingly, argued the Government, the Fourth Circuit was correct on
the merits and, ordinarily, the Government would not have called for the
Court to rule.
As the Government's first brief explained, however, a problem
remained. Various church-related schools were not complying with
997 (1971) (per curiam).
97. See Rev. Rule 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 72-54 1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev. Rul. 75-
231,1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 75-50,1975-2 C.B. 587.
98. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 742 I(a) to prohibit
the litigation). Justice Powell wrote the decision for the Court; Justice Douglas did not participate and
Justice Blackmun concurred.
99. See 416 U.S. at 746 (explaining that, by paying taxes and exhausting administrative remedies,
the University could then have access to judicial review and hence be able to litigate, "albeit" with a
delay, the "legality of the Service's revocation of tax-exempt status").
100. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.c. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147
(4th Cir. 1981).
101. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577.
102. U.S. Government Certiorari Response of September 1981, supra note 13, at II, 12-16, 136
LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 38-43.
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efforts by the IRS to investigate whether they too had racially
discriminatory practices. Moreover, Congress had prohibited the IRS
from using funds appropriated to enforce rules that "would cause the loss
of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church operated schools"
unless the investigations pre-dated 1978.103 Given the "sensitivity of
claims" about the freedom of religion and the congressional constraint, the
Government asked the Supreme Court to "dispel the uncertainty
surrounding the propriety of the Service's ruling position and foster
greater compliance on the part ofthe affected institutions.,,104
But a few months thereafter, the Administration's position changed. In
November, Congressman Trent Lott filed a pro se amicus briefl 05 that
cited the congressional rider prohibiting the IRS from spending money to
enforce its policy as he argued that "racial discrimination does not always
violate public policy."106 He characterized the IRS actions as illicit, "[a]d
hoc determinations by unelected bureaucrats" in "fundamental" matters of
the First Amendment. 107 Lott's position was echoed by others and,
according to newspaper reports, the government then bowed to "the
entreaties of conservative political figures," including Senator Strom
Thurmond, a trustee of Bob Jones University, and "a broad swath of
evangelical and conservative religious leaders for whom the long-
simmering exemption issue had become a political rallying point."108 In
January of 1982, the Government filed a memorandum stating its plan to
"refund the disputed tax payments" and to restore Bob Jones' tax-exempt
status. 109
A few days later, however, the President went to Congress with
legislation that would have expressly authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury and the IRS to deny "tax-exempt status to private non-profit
educational organizations with racially discriminatory policies."llo Then,
103. ld at 15-16,136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 42-43.
104. ld. at 16-17, 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 43-44.
105. Congressman Lott explained that the Government "has refused to provide a letter of consent
because of a general policy of not consenting to the filing of such briefs by members of Congress."
Lott Bob Jones Amicus Filing, Nov. 27,1981, supra note 26, Motion at (i).
106. ld, Amicus Brief at 18 (citing Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) and arguing that while an institution's right to "pursue diversity is not constitutionally
protected ... its right to practice its religion is protected by the First Amendment").
107. ld at 19.
108. See Paul Taylor, Defeat for Religious Right, Vindication for Civil Rights Groups, WASH.
POST, May 25,1983, at A9. See also Anthony Lewis, The Court Says No, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,1983,
at A27 (describing the "real reason for the switch" to be the political pressure for a change in policy
and raising concerns that the Department of Justice ought to have been immune to such pressure).
109. Supplemental Brief of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American
Jewish Committee, as Amici Curiae, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3), reprinted in 136
LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 740, 741 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief of the Lawyers' Committee et
al.l
110. Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 2, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 &
81-3) (filed in February 1982), reprinted in 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 92-93.
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the Treasury Department stated that it would not provide tax-exempt status
to various groups until after Congress acted, but that it would grant such
status for both Bob Jones and for Goldsboro Christian Schools, whose
cases had been consolidated before the Supreme Court. III In short,
through a subsequent filing in the Supreme Court and through legislative
and executive initiatives, the Government tried to avoid a decision by the
Supreme Court by mooting or by changing the record in the case.
But "the Government" was not univocal. Rather, its revised request to
the Supreme Court had become a cause celebre. The New York Times
carried front page stories (also recounted in briefs filed in the Supreme
Court) about several senior officials of the Administration, joined by
"more than 200 lawyers and others in the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division," who had expressed "serious concern" about the
government's decision to change its views in Bob Jones. I 12 Internal
documents were released, revealing "intense lobbying by key Southern
Conservatives in Congress.,,113 Editorials and news stories describing
efforts to achieve legislative compromises followed,114 as did several
amici filings in the Supreme Court--objecting to the Government's
retreat. 115
The Supreme Court responded by appointing William T. Coleman as an
amicus to brief and to argue in support of the 1978 IRS action to revoke
the tax exemptions. 116 Coleman himself had attended a racially segregated
elementary school before becoming one of seven black students to
matriculate at Germantown High School,ll7 and was thereafter "the first
African American accepted on the Harvard Law Review.,,118 By the time
III. Supplemental Brief of the Lawyers Committee et ai., supra note 109, at 2-3, 136 LANDMARK
at 741-42.
112. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., 200 in U.S. Agency Criticize Decision on Tax Exemptions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1982, at Al [hereinafter 200 Criticize]. This article is also cited in the United Church
of Christ Bob Jones Mootness Filing, supra note 30, at 4-6, which listed, as the senior officials
expressing concern, "Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., head of the Internal Revenue Service, Lawrence G.
Wallace, the Deputy Solicitor General in charge of these cases; James F. Murray, of the Justice
Department's Tax Division; Theodore Olson, head of the Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and
Peter G. Wallison, General Counsel ofthe Treasury Department."
113. 200 Criticize, supra note 112, at A21.
114. See Editorial: The Law Demystified, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1982, at A24; Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Reagan Tax Exemption Bill Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,1982, at A18; Martin Tolchin, Reagan May
Back Joint Resolution on Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,1982, at AI.
115. See, e.g., Tribe/Wolfman Bob Jones Brief, supra note 30.
116. See Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982) (Order of April
19, 1982) (inviting Coleman to serve as an amicus to support the judgment below). See also Coleman
Bob Jones Amicus Brief, supra note 30.
117. See Medal of Freedom, Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipient William T. Coleman, Jr.,
available at http://www.medaloffreedom.com/WilliamTColemanJr.htm (last visited March 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Medal of Freedom).
118. See Remarks of President Clinton, awarding William Coleman the Medal of Freedom, Sept.
29, 1995, available at http://www.c1intonfoundation.org/legacy/092995-speech-by-president-in-
medal-of-freedom-presentation.htm (last visited March 14,2005).
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of his appointment as amicus in Bob Jones, Coleman was a prominent
member of the private bar, had worked with Thurgood Marshall on the
Brown litigation, and had served in the 1970s as the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund's. president and as the Secretary of Transportation under
President Ford; he was also "a longtime Republican."119
At the oral argument in the fall of 1982, William Bradford Reynolds,
Assistant Attorney General and head of the Department of Justice's Civil
Rights division, explained the Government's change in views (but not of
heart). 120 Upon rereading the 1913 congressional legislation crafting
charitable exemptions, according to Reynolds, the Government had
concluded that the statute ought to be construed through a common law
understanding of what was then charitable. The Government's revised
view was that the 1913 Congress had not given "broad, unfettered
authority to the commissioner of the Internal Revenue to grant or deny
exempt status based on his independent notions of national public
policy."121
In contrast, court-appointed amicus William Coleman claimed that the
federal statute at issue did authorize the IRS to refuse "charitable"
institutions tax-exempt status. He argued that the content of what violates
"national policy" and what constitutes "charitable" purposes changes with
the times. 122 Specifically, Coleman stated that the commitment to
nondiscrimination on the basis of race had become "constitutive," as
bedrock a feature of the United States as was the proposition that religions
could not engage in "sacrifice."123
The Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that Bob Jones was not a "charitable" organization qualifying
for tax exemptions because charities provided public benefits that racist
educational institutions did not. 124 Further, said the majority, the
Government's interest in imposing its rules in lieu of the proffered
religious views of the University was "compelling" because the
"Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education--discrimination that prevailed, with official
approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's constitutional history."125
According to the Court, that interest outweighed "whatever burden denial
119. Medal of Freedom, supra note 117.
120. "The United States government has no tolerance for racial discrimination in the field of
education both public and private." Oral Argument of William Bradford Reynolds on Behalf of the
United States, reprinted in 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 764 (Oct. 12, 1982).
121. Id. at 766.
122. Oral Argument of William T. Coleman, reprinted in 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at 777-
78 (Oct. 12, 1982) (using as an example that preservation of parks had come to be understood as a
charitable activity).
123. Id. at 777.
124.. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591-95.
125. Id. at 604.
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of tax benefits placed" on the exercise of the religious beliefs at Bob
Jones. 126
Cover found the Court's decision unsatisfactory. Cover disapproved of
the Court's nesting its judgment in statutory interpretationl27 that avoided
the constitutional question of whether Congress could grant tax exemption
to schools that discriminated on the basis of race. Cover described the
ruling as a "failure of the Court's commitment-a failure that manifests
itself in the designation of authority for the decision."128 Cover's
complaint was that the Court assumed
a position that places nothing at risk and from which the Court makes
no interpretative gesture at all, save the quintessential gesture to the
jurisdictional canons: the statement that an exercise of political
authority [of the IRS over Bob Jones] was not unconstitutional. 129
According to Cover, when the state acts in an imperialist and jurispathic
fashion, it should do so because of a profound imperative. The "minority
community deserved more, it deserved a constitutional commitment to
avoiding public subsidization of racism.,,130
I think that Cover was wrong about Bob Jones University, and wrong in
two ways. First, the majority decision can be read as the very kind of
jurisgenerative moment that Cover found appealing. True, the Burger
opinion is lacking in expression, narrative power, and eloquence. No great
"redemptive narrative" is given of the "struggle for racial equaiity."131
But the majority issued its decision-written by a Chief Justice identified
with the Republican Administration-over two objections on the Court
and amidst heated and public battles in the Congress, in the Department of
Justice, and within the Republican Party.
Specifically, Chief Justice Burger refused to take the positions promoted
by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Concurring, Justice Powell had
advocated a narrow ruling. For him, the statutory construction of the
lower court was not "without logical support" which, when coupled with
legislative "acquiescence in and ratification by implication" of IRS policy,
merited affinnance. 132 Yet he worried that the majority could be read as
126. Id
127. Id at 599, n.24 (commenting that many amici, including William Coleman, had argued that
the denial of a tax-exempt status was "independently required by the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment," but that the Court did not reach the issue). Some commentators believe that
the ruling implicitly adopts that position. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race. Religion,
and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. I.
128. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 66. Other commentators shared his concern.
As Mayer Freed and Daniel Polsby put it: "Justice required, not a different result from that reached by
the Court, but only an acknowledgement of the difficulty." Freed & Polsby, supra note 127, at 31.
129. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 66.
130. Idat67.
131. Idat65.
132. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 606-07 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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ceding too much power to the IRS.133 Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist,
insisted that only Congress could rule out a tax exemption for Bob Jones
and it had not done SO.134 For Justice Rehnquist, what he characterized as
the "strong national policy in this country against racial discrimination"135
was not strong enough-without action from other legal actors-to
overwhelm religiously-grounded racism. Had Rehnquist prevailed, the
Court would in fact have ducked the issue by punting to Congress.
Yet despite those objections, despite the Government's retreat, and
despite the appropriation rider that had blocked the IRS from using funds
"to enforce any 'court order'" entered after 1978 that would have
prevented racially-segregating schools from obtaining tax exemptions,136
the majority refused either the easy, jurisdictional dodge of relying on a
change in the record to avoid decision or the response that the merits of
the decision belonged to Congress. Instead, the majority insisted that the
IRS's decision was so ordinary as to need no ratification by Congress;
racial segregation in education was self-evidently unacceptable. As I read
the decision,137 the Court owned its conclusion by ignoring the waffling
Executive, by finding the Government's interest "compelling" (rather than
"strong" as per Justice Rehnquist), and by de~ermining that Bob Jones
University's practices of racial segregation were not "in harmony with the
public interest."138
Chief Justice Burger et at. did indeed face Bob Jones University and
prevent it from obtaining a public subsidy through tax exemption. Of
equal import, the Court refused the Administration's proposal to use a
jurisdictional device to avoid the Supreme Court from entering a binding
judgment. The Court did so by reasoning that anti-segregation obligations
permeated the public space such that the IRS had done nothing special,
heroic, or expansive when cutting off the tax-exempt status. The
commitment to anti-racism was so pervasive that it had turned into both an
ordinary feature of "public policy" and at the same time a foundational
obligation that overrode religious commitments, however "genuine."139
The majority's poker-faced insistence on the deep truth of the non-
133. Jd. at 606, 611-12. See also Paul 8. Stephan 111, Bob Jones University v. United States:
Public Policy in Search of Tax Policy, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 33 (1984) (raising concerns about the
"apparent revival" oflicensing public policy constructions of the Internal Revenue Code).
134. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 612 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
135. Jd.
136. See 127 Congo Rec. H5392-98 (daily ed. July 20, 1981), cited in Lott Bob Jones Amicus
Filing, supra note 26, at 5.
137. This reading is consistent with the dissent by Justice Rehnquist, reviewing some of the
conflict within the Administration on the policy and objecting to the majority's holding.
138. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 618 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting and quoting the majority opinion
at 592).
139. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978) ("The Court
finds and the defendant has admitted that plaintiffs beliefs against interracial dating and marriage are
genuine religious beliefs.").
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discrimination norm made it much more difficult for legislative and
executive actors to continue their efforts to obtain tax-favorable treatment
for such discriminators. 140 As then Attorney General William French
Smith explained, it was "clear that additional legislation" was not
needed. 141 And, according to recent commentary, the University "has paid
taxes ever since.,,142
So rather than see (as Cover did) that neither side in Bob Jones
University v. United States was put to the test necessary for a
jurisgenerative moment, I read the decision as an example of what Cover
sought from courts and from social orders. State lawmaking had pushed
Bob Jones from its flat ban on "Negroes" to a ban on "unmarried
Negroes" and then to a ban on dating "Negroes.,,143 United States law
refused that accommodation through a legal regime rich enough to be
sustained not only through constitutional dictates by the Supreme Court,
but through regulations by low level bureaucrats who came to know that
they were obliged to implement norms of non-segregation.
The revised constitutional policy had by then become so entrenched that
it was constitutive. Within Cover's terms, the IRS practices and those of
the Justice Department's lawyers were akin to the lived, thick experience
of law's meaning that he found appealing in sectarian communities. The
"200 lawyers and others in the Justice Department's Civil Rights
Division" who had made public their protest against the Executive
140. Newspaper reports quoted one civil rights advocate, Richard Larson of the American Civil
Liberties Union, as stating that the "need for legislation was moot." See Paul Taylor, Defeat for
Religious Right, Vindication for Civil Rights Groups, WASH. POST, May 25, 1983, at A9. A New York
Times editorial, highly critical of the Administration "for having dredged up" arguments to give tax-
exempt status, quoted President Reagan's response-"We will obey the law"-and added "It's about
time." Editorial, Tax-Exempt Hate, Undone, N.Y. TiMES, May 25, 1983, at A26.
A quick search for post-Bob Jones developments in Congress located some hearings thereafter
on the tax-exempt status of private schools and some concerns about IRS enforcement when policies
were not overt, but not a spate of bills seeking to shelter organizations like Bob Jones. See, e.g.,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Exempt Status of Certain Private
Schools, 132 Congo Rec. D 484 (daily ed. April 28, 1986); 133 Congo Rec. E 1706 (daily ed. May 4,
1987) (reporting on the Subcommittee for Oversight's revision of guidelines for the "handling of cases
where there is evidence of prior racial discriminatory operations by a private school"). And, as Bob
Cover had argued in his 1983 op-ed, the focus of opponents shifted to vouchers and tax deductions for
private education. Cover, Court Has High Aim, supra note 89.
141. Linda Greenhouse, High Court Bans Tax Exemptions for Schools with Racial Barriers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1983, at AI.
142. Bob Jones University: A Boot Camp for Bigots, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., SPRING 2000, at
15-16. The article focused on President George W. Bush's visit to the University in February of 2000
to "pin down votes in the state's most racially conservative territory."
143. While I find that reconfiguration a positive example, in that normative communities can
themselves change and evolve in their views, Cover saw it as a retreat from commitment. See Cover,
Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 51 ("Bob Jones University once interpreted its controlling
biblical texts to require that no unmarried black person be admitted to the school; but after the power
of the state was invoked to deny the University favorable tax status, that interpretation was withdrawn.
I do not know the extent to which the state's coercive action caused the interpretative change, but I
suspect that the change was at least partly attributable to weakness of commitment in the original
interpretative act.").
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decision were vindicated; 144 their administrative commitment against
racism had been confirmed by the Supreme Court not because it was
extraordinary but because it was obvious.
The newspaper stories in the days after the Court ruled tell this story.
The Washington Post's headline ran: "Court Bars 2 Schools' Tax Break:
Administration Is Repudiated on Race Bias Stance.,,145 Another story in
the Post described the decision as a "sharply worded" "defeat for the
religious right" and a "fiasco" for the administration that "brought to the
close, at least for now" the political flip flopping of the Reagan
administration that had "infuriated friend and foe.,,146 An editorial,
captioned "Bob Jones U Trounced, 8-1," described the administration's
attempt to reverse "longstanding tax policy" as "a disastrous legal and
political blunder."147 The New York Times categorized the decision as one
of several putting "reins" on Reagan by its repudiation of the White House
policy that had become "one of the major civil rights debates of recent
years."148 Its editorial was captioned: "Tax-Exempt Hate, Undone.,,149
Bob Jones University v. United States is a cram-down of a national
norm, an insistence that inside the identity of America, no private enclave
can provide an overtly racist educational environment and obtain the
state's assistance. Further, the insistence came with an admission of the
prior errors made in the name of United States law. Here, Chief Justice
Burger's explanation merits repeating: the "Government has a
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education-discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the
first 165 years of this Nation's constitutional history."15o
The opinion's willingness to admit the State's role in creating the
conditions of oppression has been repeated in other instances when
questions of segregation or racial classification have been raised. A recent
example is the 2005 decision of Johnson v. California, overturning a
Ninth Circuit judgment that prison officials, relying on claims of security,
could classify prisoners by race and house them initially only with
144. Church of Christ Bob Jones Mootness Filing, supra note 30, at 5-6,136 LANDMARK at 705-
706 (citing the New York Times articles of Feb. 3 and 4,1982, at A-I). See also 200 Criticize, supra
note 112.
145. See Fred Barbash, Court Bars 2 Schools' Tax Break; Administration Is Repudiated on Race
Bias Stance, WASH. POST, May 25, 1983, at AI.
146. Paul Taylor, Defeat for Religious Right, Vindication for Civil Rights Groups, WASH. POST,
May 25, 1983, at A9.
147. Bob Jones U Trounced, 8-1, WASH. POST, May 25, 1983, at A24.
148. Linda Greenhouse, ForcefUl Term ofSupreme Court Puts Reins on Congress and Reagan,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1983, at AI. See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Tax Exemption Ruling: An Old Question
Still Lingers, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1983, at B16 (describing the ruling as a "rebuff' to the
administration but also noting that, while very few private religious schools had such overt race-based
classifications, covert discrimination remained a problem).
149. Tax-Exempt Hate, Undone, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1983, at A26.
150. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
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cellmates of the same race·. 151 The lower courts had read the Supreme
Court's general embrace of a deferential standard of review for decisions
by prison administrators l52 to authorize a comparable approach in this
case. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority flatly rejected such a
discount for prison officials' expertise; all race-based classifications,
according to her, merit strict scrutiny.153 And, as in Bob Jones, her
majority opinion reiterated the history of discrimination within
government systems (in this case in the criminal justice system) as an
"especially pernicious" practice that had to be rejected. 154
But as William Coleman had commented in 1982 in his oral argument
in Bob Jones, other status-based categories-like sex discrimination-
were not so self-evidently impermissible. Their use might not render such
institutions ''uncharitable'' for want of enhancing the public welfare.
"Where it is crystal clear that there is a national commitment,"155 the IRS
actions were within its powers, but, Coleman noted, had the exclusion
been on the basis of sex, it would have been a "much more difficult
question.,,156 The bar against formal racial classifications established in
Bob Jones and reiterated in Johnson v. California, is a stark and a lone
marker, all too readily contrasted with the Court's refusal to focus on
racial disparities in the application of the criminal law,157 its timid
engagement with affirmative action in education,158 its unwillingness to
consider other ways in which the Tax Code can facilitate racial
discrimination,159 and its ambivalence about other forms of status-marking
lSI. 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (ceding a good deal of decisionmaking to
prison administrators and restricting judges to an assessment of the rational relationship between a
particular practice and the assertion by correctional officials of legitimate goals to be forwarded).
153. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Justices
Souter and Breyer) (reiterating their commitment to a different assessment when classifications by
race were used to remedy discrimination and citing the concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 344-46 (Ginsburg, 1. concurring, joined by Breyer, J.)). Justice Stevens argued that the
Court should have held the practice unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 1153-57 (Stevens, J.
dissenting). Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented on the grounds that prison officials ought to be able
to classify on race if needed. Id. at 1157-72.
154. 125 S. Ct. at 1149 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,555 (1979)).
155. Oral Argument of William Coleman, supra note 122, in 136 LANDMARK, supra note 12, at
784.
156. Id. at 786. See Judith C. Miles, Beyond Bob Jones: Toward the Elimination of
Governmental Subsidy ofDiscrimination ofReligious Institutions, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 31 (1985)
(arguing for an end to charitable deductions for religions and citing their history of discrimination on
the basis of sex).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (refusing discovery to support a
claim that African-Americans prosecuted for drug offenses for crack were differentially treated than
those prosecuted for cocaine offenses, who were more likely to be white); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987) (refusing to rely on aggregate evidence of racial disparity in sentencing to invalidate
the application of a sentence ofdeath).
158. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The
form of affirmative action that was endorsed both requires institutions to be wealthy enough to devote
resources to individualized evaluations and permits great discretion.
159. See David A. Brennen, Race and Equality Across the Law School Curriculum: The Law of
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divisions, ranging from the Court's rejection of challenges to various sex-
based classifications l6o to its toleration of organizational homophobia in
the Boy ScoutS. 161
Cover foresaw this in 1983 when, in an op-ed, he argued that the
practical import of the Bob Jones decision was limited. 162 In that brief
essay, Cover was highly critical of another decision, Mueller v. Allen163 in
which Justice Rehnquist, for a majority of five, upheld a Minnesota statute
permitting taxpayers to deduct the cost of private education. l64 Cover
argued that permitting states to provide tax deductions for private
education, given the "Reagan Administration's proposals for tuition tax
credits for parents of children attending private schools" amounted to a
public subsidy for the "white flight" that sabotages effective racial
integration in so many communities.... It is a pious fraud to say that
there is a commitment in America to combat racial discrimination in
education while the courts open the way to such dramatic subsidization
of white flight ... The Com that protects the sanctuaries of white flight
and the administration that panders to it are more responsible for the
patterns of segregation and inequality in education than are the
misguided fundamentalists of Bob Jones. 165
In short, what was wrong with the ruling in Bob Jones University v.
United States was not (for me) the Court's decision to base its holding on
the obviousness (and hence the statutorily-embeddedness) of the illegality
of state-enabled racial segregation, but the Court's limited appreciation for
what a non-segregation norm ought to entail. The Court could comfortably
license the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to institutions that had overt
policies of exclusionary racial classification without fear of a slippery
slope-that bureaucratic authority would be used to make more profound
changes. Indeed, the Court has proceeded, repeatedly, to forbid a broader
understanding of the problems of discrimination by prohibiting a range of
interventions that attempt to redress the injuries of identity-based
subordination. 166
Tax Exemption, 54 J. LEG. EDUC. 336 (2004).
160. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 69 and infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text; Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001). See generally Vema L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the
Construction ofRace and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 16. Further, about a decade of litigation was
required before sex-segregated state-supported education at the Virginia Military Academy and at the
Citadel, both of which trained men but not women to be "citizen-soldiers," was found to be
unconstitutional. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
161. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
162. See Robert M. Cover, Court Has High Aim, supra note 89.
163. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
164. Id. at 390. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented.
165. Cover, Court Has High Aim, supra note 89.
166. See generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
ofStatus-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
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Cover's second error may be one clearer in hindsight than at the time.
Cover faulted the Court for failing to decide whether, as a matter of First
and Fourteenth Amendment law, tax exemptions for religious
organizations practicing racial segregation were impermissible. 167 The
statutory ruling did not, in Cover's view, express a full enough
commitment. In contrast, constitutional lawyers are now concerned about
the ease with which some members of the Court rely on the Constitution
to overturn congressional statutes and to preempt the exercise ofjudgment
by other governmental actors. 168 In the name of fidelity to the
Constitution, today's jurispathic Court regularly kills congressional
pronouncements rather than-as Robert Post and Reva Siegel have
written-facilitate dialogic co-venturing in which the Court and Congress
work together to build the meaning of constitutional norms and
practices. l69 Today, goes the logic of the Court, if a rule is of
constitutional dimensions, the Court has exclusive control. I70 Moreover,
that control has been used to limit the degree to which inventive remedial
regimes can be developed by either Congress or administrative agencies
and private organizations. 17l
In this era, such "commitment" by the COurtl72 to a constitutional rule
has generated instances of dysfunctional rigidity. State sovereign
immunity is one such example. Formerly a doctrine mixing constitutional
and common law precepts, it has now been reconfigured as a
constitutional prohibition on congressional use of the Commerce Clause to
provide individuals with monetary remedies against states that violate
federal statutes. 173 Thus, the very moderation of the Court in Bob Jones
that left open space for many levels of government to generate policy has
advantages over a juriscentric constitutional practice that so constrains
other actors. The liberal state's encounter with Bob Jones University
provided the occasion for a wide array of federal officials to act. 174 And,
167. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 66.
168. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term -- Foreword: We, the Court, 115
HARV. L. REv. 4 (2001).
169. Robert C. Post & Reva 8. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation ofthe Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003).
170. Some blurry boundaries remain. See, e.g., Lara v. United States, 541 U.S. 193 (2004),
discussed in Resnik, Myths and Methods of Marbury, supra note 68, at 120-23 (describing the
constitutional cornmon law status of some rules of federal Indian law).
171. See, e.g., Board ofTrustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that
Congress had exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and could not
abrogate states' immunity from suit given the record information about state activities related to
persons with disabilities); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (limiting
governmental affirmative action); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional take-title provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985).
172. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note I, at 66 ("the failure of the Court's commitment").
173. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
174. See Neal Devins, On Casebooks and Canons or Why Bob Jones University Will Never Be
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as the sequence of events made plain, a country that had once mandated
segregation by law had come to reject that idea so thoroughly that it would
not tolerate race-based segregation even when predicated upon religious
interpretation.
IV. DISSIDENT VOICES AND UNDEMOCRATIC ITERATIONS:
TRIBES AND VEILS
Insofar as I am aware, Bob Jones was an "easy" case in one respect:
none of the University's members openly contested the claim of a
scriptural obligation to segregate the races. 175 Further, Robert Cover did
not take up the question of the internal constitution of Bob Jones
University, or of the Amish, the Mennonites, or the Jews. He did not
interrogate the power within communities of culture whose passionate
commitment to principles he recognized as jurisgenerative.
But many such conflicts raise questions about which members of
paideic communities have the authority to make community law. As the
focus on contestation moves from racialized identities to engendered
identities, and as so many communities-both secular and religious-are
patriarchal, today's conflicts about community traditions often entail
struggles about the meaning of equality for women. As I noted at the
outset, evocative conflicts include debates about the use of patrilineal
membership rules and the veiling of women. To conclude, I focus on the
problem of the interaction among internal dissidents, paideic communities,
and the secular state.
In introducing my concerns in this essay, I offered two examples of
gendered conflicts, one involving Indian tribes and the other involving
Muslim girls wearing veils. Tum first to a case in the United States, filed
in the 1970s by Julia Martinez, challenging the refusal of the Santa Clara
Pueblo to consider her children (whose father was a Navajo) to be Santa
Claran. Without such recognition, her children could not enroll as Pueblo
members eligible for federal health benefits and tribal inheritance land
rights. 176 The Pueblo invoked its constitution of 1939 that specified a
patrilineal rule. 177 Contesting the rule, Julia Martinez relied on a 1968
federal statute, the Indian Civil Rights Act, giving tribal members
enforceable rights of equal protection against their tribes. J78
The Supreme Court's conclusion was the kind of jurisdictional decision
Part of the Constitutional Law Canon, 17 CONST. COMM. 285 (2000). Despite this title, Devins
argued that first year law students ought to be required to read the decision.
175. As noted, some of those filing to uphold Bob Jones's right to ban interracial dating
disagreed, as Christians, with its interpretation of the Scriptures. See supra note 33.
176. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1978).
177. Id at 53.
178. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
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Cover identified as a failure. The Court held that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear Ms. Martinez because, when enacting the 1968 statute,
Congress had specifically given federal courts habeas corpus jurisdiction
but had not affirmatively stated that the federal judiciary had authority to
entertain implied private causes of action against tribal officials. 179 Ms.
Martinez's only remedy, according to the Court, was to seek relief in tribal
courts180 from which no federal review was available.
Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the majority-blocking access
to the federal courts-rested in part on his awareness of longstanding
federal efforts to destroy tribal identity. To implement that goal, the
United States had instituted policies aimed at disaggregating tribal land
and forcing migration. 181 Justice Marshall sought to help the
reinvigoration of tribal self-governance by insisting that tribal sovereignty,
predating that of the United States, ought to remain unimpaired unless
affirmatively divested by Congress. 182 In Coverian terms, he worried
about the jurispathic powers of courts and understood well the
jurisgenerative possibilities, especially of communities that had long been
subordinated.
His ability to command a majority, however, stemmed also from the fact
that the Pueblo's patrilineal norm was not foreign but familiar within the
United States. Not only was such a rule shared by the English common
law, but the Pueblo's patrilineal rule had only been codified upon the
Pueblo's interaction with American cultures. Incentives created by the
United States pressed tribes to write constitutions and to detail constraints
on those eligible for federal benefits.183 Moreover, in 1978, when the case
was litigated (and today), federal constitutional commitments to the
equality of women and men continue to permit distinctions in citizenship
rules based on whether those rights stem from mothers or fathers.
Specifically, in 2001, the Supreme Court upheld an immigration statute
that treated differently children born abroad and out of wedlock,
depending upon whether their mother or their father was an American
citizen. 184
The Court's refusal to insist that the Pueblo's rule should bow (in any
179. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59, 72. Justice White dissented. ld. at 72-83.
180. ld. at 65-66 (Marshall, J., writing for the majority). Yet within a month of that decision, the
same Supreme Court made plain that tribal justice would not suffice for a white man accused of
causing havoc during a tribal celebration. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
See generally Resnik, Myths and Methods ofMarbury, supra note 68.
181. General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (1997) (also known as the Dawes Act).
182. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62-65.
183. See the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
461 et seq; Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 68, at 704-16 (describing the hundreds of such
constitutions that began with the phrase "We, the People" and the history of the Pueblo's 1935
Constitution that did not include that rule, its revision in 1939, and the role played by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in overseeing the rulemaking by tribes).
184. See Nguyen v. fNS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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respect) reveals that the federal equality norm that Ms. Martinez hoped
would trump the Santa Clara Pueblo's claim to its self-constitution was
too lightly-held for federal judges to force the Pueblo to give way. Yet,
time and again in federal law relating to Indian tribes, when the federal
objective is of sufficient import, the federal courts, Congress, and the
Executive have not hesitated to displace tribal self-governance. 185
When the decision in Santa Clara Pueblo is set in that context and then
considered alongside that of Bob Jones University, one can see that
disabling classifications based on sex are not as intolerable as are
disabling classifications based on race. And (here sharing Cover's
concern about the misuse of doctrines of avoidance), the jurisdictional
dodge of Santa Clara Pueblo permitted the Court to avoid a frank
engagement with what was at stake. The decision addressed the history of
tribal oppression but not much was made of the inequality of women, nor
did the Court explore methods of mitigating the federal government's
intrusion while forwarding women's rights.
My own solution would have been to require the provision of many
federal benefits to Ms. Martinez's children while remitting the question of
tribal recognition to the Pueblo. 186 But my wish for an open exchange
assumes that women's ability to devolve membership to their children as
do men would have been understood by the Court as a serious
counterweight to tribal governance. Justice Marshall might have thought
that it would do more good for tribes and less harm to the goal of women's
equality to shape the judgment as he did.
The Santa Clara Pueblo litigation also brings to the fore the question of
who creates and continues a community's expression that certain norms
are constitutive--either for tribes or for the nation-state. The record in
that litigation suggested that a patrilineal membership rule evolved over
time, as opportunities for intermarrying grew and as incentives to limit
membership increased. 187 But the emergence of a patrilineal rule-as
contrasted with one of naturalization (extant from 1935 to 1939) or of
matrilineage (a tradition of the Navajo Nation, for example)--depended
on the relative power of men and women to make the rules of and to speak
on behalf of "the" Pueblo. Similarly, the resilience of sex-based
classifications in United States' law--displayed in this nation's laws on
citizenship and the military, as well as its deference to religious
communities' classifications by sex--occurs in a country in which men
are eighty-six percent of the members of the Senate, about eighty-four
185. llIustrative are the decisions in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, and in Nevada v. Hicks,
discussed supra notes 70-71, and accompanying text.
186. This solution is imperfect, as one of the federal benefits sought was assistance with building
a home on the Pueblo.
187. See Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 68, at 714-16.
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percent of the House of Representatives,188 and more than eighty percent
of the sitting, life-tenured federal judges. 1.89
The question of voice is also central to the debate about the veiling of
women, the French principle of lai'cite, and the prohibition on
"conspicuous" symbols of religion in France's public schools. Much of
the discussion takes for granted that the nation-state fears the religiosity
and the "otherness" of Islam. But the claimed secularity of the French
social order developed through conflicts during the 1789 revolutionary era
and then during the Third Republic, at the tum of the twentieth century
when that nation was concerned about limiting the power of the Catholic
Church. 190 From this vantage point, the principle of lai'cite, founded upon
profound anti-Catholic sentiments and developed during years in which
women had no official voice in the French government, has now become a
means to protect Christianity from perceived threats from other religious
traditions.
Who speaks for French women today remains at issue. The Stasi
Report, officially commissioned by the Government, presents itself as
speaking "for" young girls .by explaining that its proposed ban on the veil
respects their equality. 191 But in January of 2004, an estimated 20,000
French Muslims-described as "mostly women wearing various forms of
hijab"-protested in several cities. They were quoted as claiming that
they, not their "fathers nor husbands," had chosen to wear headscarves. 192
As Niliifer GOle has explained the shifting valence of that practice:
The headscarf, symbol of backwardness, ignorance, and subservience
for Muslim women in modem contexts, fights back to become, once
again, as it has thought to be in the Islamic past, a symbol of
distinction and prestige for urban Muslim women. 193
Veiling can be both empowering and oppressive, protective and
188. See http://clerk.house.gov/members/memFAQ.html#Women (noting that fourteen women are
in the Senate and sixty-eight women in the House).
189. See http://www.fjc.gov. From this website, one can request a list of all sitting judges,
including those with senior status, by gender. As of March of 2005, the website indicated that 223
women and 1057 men were members of the United States life-tenuredjudiciary.
190. Gunn, supra note 17, at 432-33. He argues that while laicite is currently claimed to be a
"pillar" of that country's commitment to tolerance, in fact it was once a mechanism to limit the power
of the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 428-29, 432-41.
191. Stasi Report, supra note 23, at 4.2.2.1 ("L'ecole") (commenting that "Pour celle qui Ie
portent, Ie voile peut revetir differentes significations. Ce peu etre un choix personnel ou au contraire
une constrainte, particulierement intolerable pour les plus jeunes. . .. Pour celles qui ne Ie portent pas,
la signification du voile islamique stigmatise 'Ia jeune fille pubere ou la femme comme seul
responsable du desir de I'homme,' vision qui contrevient fondamentalement au principle de'egalite
entre les homme et les femmes.").
192. Paul Silverstein, Headscarves and the French Tricolor, MIDDLE EAST REPORT ONLINE, Jan
30, 2004, ~ 23, available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero013004.html(..ni pere, ni mari, Ie foulard
on I'a choisi").
193. See generally Niliifer Gcile, The Voluntary Adoption of Islamic Stigma Symbols, 70 Soc.
REs. 817, 821 (2003).
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authorizing for some young women while constraining for others, a mode
of rebellion by young women against the practices of their parents or a
mark of limitations imposed by their parents. And how much French
society is committed to enabling young women to free themselves from
subjugation based on gender is questionable in light of the recent "beauty
contests" about which female will represent the new "Marianne,"194 long a
symbol of France. 195
The debate about women and their expressions of culture and religion in
France is now well into its second decade. The meanings of the equality
of women and men, of the principle of lai'cite, and of veiling are proffered
by a range of authorities within France (the Conseil Constitutional, the
Stasi Report, the bureaucracy of the state's Education Ministry), various
Muslim communities, individual protestors, and dozens of commentators.
Through those iterations and conflicts, the significance of latcite, of the
veil, and of one aspect of French identity has already changed. As Gole
has insightfully explained, the veil itself has come to be identified with
France l96 and, if not quite as emblematic as Marianne, closely bound up
with the French State. Indeed, when two French reporters were captured
in Iraq, the attackers demanded the retraction of the rule against veiling. 197
Almost immediately, widespread protests-with Islamic women at their
center--emerged, objecting to efforts by outsiders to interfere with their
internal, their very French, battle. As one journalist covering the events
put it: "Paradoxically, for the first time, French Muslims have united on a
major political issues and rallied behind the French government. They
194. In 1999, the Association of Mayors of France sponsored a contest to select a twenty-first
century "Marianne" and picked a model and actress, Laetitia Casta, to serve as the model for the bust
of the icon that was to be featured in over 36,000 town halls across France. See Debra Olliver, Libert,
Egalit, 36C, Salon.com (Feb. 19, 2000), available at
http://dir.salon.comlpeople/featureI2000/02/19/mkarianne/index.htm!(last visited Apr. 4, 2005);
Model Choice for France, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 1999), available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukll/hilworld/europe/468595.stm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). The contest was
repeated in October of 2003, when a television star, Evelyne Thomas, was chosen as the new
"Marianne." See Chat Show Host Is France's New Marianne, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17,2003), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/3200840.strn (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). In addition to statutes in
town halls, the image of Marianne appears on many official French documents, stamps and coins, as
well as in paintings old and new and on a variety of merchandise. Originally "the anonymous
peasant," the "unassuming unaristocratic girl" or the "cherished figure of political emancipation,"
latter day Mariannes have been publicly recognizable women, including Bridget Bardot, Catherine
Deneuve, Casta, and Thomas. See Debra Olliver, supra.
195. See MAURICE AGULHON, MARIANNE INTO BATTLE: REpUBLICAN IMAGERY AND
SYMBOLISM IN FRANCE, 1789-1880 (Janet Lloyd trans., 1979). A woman wearing a Phyrgian cap
(itself a marker of liberty worn by freed slaves in Greece) became a common figure during the French
Revolution, also serving as an allegorical representation of Liberty and of the Republic. At some
point, the name Marie-Anne and then Marianne became attached to a specific embodiment of a female
identified with France.
196. Niliifer Gole, Lecture at Whitney Humanities Center, Yale University (Sept. 22, 2004). See
also Beller, supra note 18, at 597 (describing some Muslims arguing from their understanding of
themselves as French about their right to wear scarves).
197. See Elaine Sciolino, The Reach of War: Terrorism, Hostages Urge France to Repeal Its
ScarfBan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,2004, at A8.
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essentially told the hostage-takers that they should stay out of France's
affairs."198
V. GENERATIONAL INTUITIONS
By bringing together the examples of racial segregation, patrilineal
membership rules, and veiling, I hope to have underscored how much our
views about the legitimacy of norms (held by a nation-state or by a paideic
community) are shaped by our contemporary culture, intolerant of certain
practices and unquestioning of others. During one era, Bob Jones
University's segregationist practices were not seen as problematic,
whereas within three decades, they were understood to be so antagonistic
to the American project as to be subject to an IRS penalty without fear of
over-empowering that bureaucracy. In contrast, in terms of which
practices respect and which undermine women and men's equal treatment,
we remain deeply conflicted.
Thus, Robert Post's commentary on Robert Cover correctly focuses us
on the importance of generational contexts as we consider the plausibility
of laws and practices. 199 Post located Cover as part of "a generation, of
my [Post's] generation, which faced a violent state that drafted its citizens
to fight an alien war in Vietnam.,,2oo Post is right to underscore political
socialization, but Robert Cover did not come of age during the Vietnam
conflict. Rather, a bit older than Post, Cover's formative experiences took
place when the state itself tolerated the violence of whites against blacks
and failed, for decades, to intervene. As Steve Wizner has told me, in the
1960s, Cover gave up a scholarship to go to Asia and instead went to the
deep South in the United States to join freedom fighters challenging
segregation.201 Having seen the legacy of slavery, Cover responded with
Justice Accused,202 his assessment of the judiciary's complicity in the
practices of slavery. And, as is evident from my discussion here, the
signature generational conflict for me is about gender equality.
Robert Cover worried, from his lived experiences and his deep
understanding of United States history, about judges who did too little,
who contributed too little, who aborted the dialogue that presses normative
communities to make good on their own views, or to change them, and the
state to make true its meanings, or change them. Today, we worry about a
Supreme Court that does too much, willing to exert its own claim and
198. See Elaine Sciolino, Ban on Head Scarves Takes Effect in a United France, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2004, at A8.
199. Post, Jurispathic Courts, supra note 44.
200. Id. at 14.
20 I. There, he was jailed and assaulted. See Stephen Wizner, Tribute to Robert M Cover, 96
YALE. LJ. 1707 (1987); see also Robert A. Burt, Robert Cover's Passion, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. I,
3 (2005).
202. See COVER, supra note 74.
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unwilling to listen to or invite in a multitude of co-lawmakers, co-
lawmakers at the level of the imperial state itself. Siegel and Post
complain about the Court's evisceration of a role for Congress.203 I
complain about the Court claiming that it knows what states want, when it
speaks in the name of "federalism" even as states themselves appear
before the Court on both sides, disagreeing about what ruling would be
''state-regarding.,,204 We have no dearth of complaints about the courts,
then and now.
But Robert Cover's guidance, wisdom, and insight transcend both his
worries, circa 1980s, and ours, now in the twenty-first century. For judges
alone are never enough to give law meaning. What Cover taught was that
the practice of the law, the daily engagement with its implications, and the
acceptance of the costs of living a legal regime were the prerequisites to
sustaining any set of governing rules. Jurisgenerative practices are
laborious, engaging, intensive, time-consuming, exhausting, and often
deeply costly, as well as joyful, obliged, and comforting.
Bob Cover also liked sports, invoking upon occasion analogies between
baseball and law.205 In that spirit, a brief summary of my understanding of
Cover's understanding of law's meaning can be put into this other
vocabulary: No pain, no gain.
203. See Post & Siegel, supra note 169; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Court
from the People: Juriscentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. LJ. I (2003).
204. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, III YALE
L.J. 619 (2001); Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin, Daphne Renan, & Laura Slacta, Federalisms: When
States Disagree (manuscript on file with the author).
205. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Your Law-Baseball Quiz, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1979, at A23.
There Cover listed John Marshall, Earl Warren, Bryon White, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Felix
Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and Louis Brandeis and invited readers to pair each justice with "the
baseball figure who bears the same relationship to baseball as the justice bears to law." He then
provided answers such as that both Earl Warren and Yogi Berra were "enormously effective
performers on teams with many stars.... Both saw through excessive thought to the true essence of
their game." Id.
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